The major concept of certificateless cryptosystem is to remove the certificate in public-key cryptosystem and solve the key escrow drawback in the ID-based scheme. For the privacy protection in the public cloud environment, the proxy re-encryption scheme was developed to allow a semi-trusted proxy to transform a ciphertext under one person's public key into other ciphertext under another person's public key without decryption. Nowadays, many related applications of certificateless proxy re-encryption scheme have been proposed. However, most of certificateless proxy re-encryption schemes allow only a single receiver, which means for more receivers, re-transforming the ciphertext multiple times is needed. This paper introduces a novel notion of proxy re-encryption in which the sender can broadcast the re-encrypted ciphertext to a group of receivers through the proxy's assistance based on certificateless public key cryptography. The proposed scheme has the property of constant-size re-encryption key and ciphertext, and is particularly suitable for the application executing in the enormous cloud networking.
Introduction
The concept of the proxy re-encryption (PRE) was first proposed by Blaze et al. [1] in 1998 and has been very popular in recent years. The PRE scheme supports the delegation of decryption via a semi-trusted third party named proxy. The proxy can apply the re-encryption key to transform the original ciphertext encrypted under delegator's (sender's) public key into the delegatee's (receiver's) public key without revealing the underlying plaintext. In the scheme, the proxy cannot learn any information about messages or obtain any unauthorized transformation key that can be used to transform the ciphertext to be one decryptable by the unauthorized users during the process. The PRE scheme allows the delegator to construct a key called re-encryption key and deliver it to the proxy to re-encrypt the messages for other users, and therefore they can use their own private keys to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertexts.
The PRE scheme is now very useful in various applications such as encrypted email forwarding system [2] , access control in file storage [3] , law enforcement [4] , cloud storage [5] , etc., and it is also particularly suitable for the storage-limited devices which need outsourcing a large amount of files to the untrusted server. The proxy re-encryption has been developed in many different manners. According to the direction of transformation, PRE can be categorized into bidirectional PRE, in which the proxy can transform the ciphertext from delegator to delegatee and vice versa, and unidirectional PRE [1] , [6] , in which the proxy can transform the ciphertext from delegator to delegatee but cannot perform it in the opposite direction. scheme can transform an encrypted message to a specific receiving group through the assistance of the proxy, and each intended user in the receiving group is allowed to decrypt the ciphertext without need of cooperation with others. That is, the sender can delegate the decryption right to a group of users at one time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives elementary definitions and security notation. Section 3 presents the detailed construction of group-oriented certificateless broadcast proxy re-encryption (GCLBPRE for short). Section 4 gives the security analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries
We propose a formal definition of our scheme. We first provide a concise overview of bilinear pairing and related computation assumption on which our GCLBPRE scheme is based.
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Definition 4 (IND-CLPRE-CCA).
The security for the CLPRE is under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) that is secure against the Type I adversary. The attacker's public key request would be answered by running the Partial-Private-Key-Extract algorithm (see the details in [16] , [17] ). In CLPRE scheme, IND-CLPRE-CCA is based on IND-CCA; the detail definitions were described in Appendix A. of [16] .
Our scheme is constructed from the modification of Yang et al.'s CLPRE [17] which provides IND-CCA security. The security in CLPRE needs to take account of both CLPKE and PRE securities. According to the security definitions in CLPKE, we need to consider two types of these adversaries. First, we must further strengthen the model to prevent the adversary from replacing the public key since there is no CA to make the certification. In addition, we also need to consider that the adversary equipped with the master key, in order to model the security against an eavesdropping PKG. The brief introduction can be seen in Section 4 of security analysis. The readers also can refer to [22] for details.
A Formal Description of the Group-Oriented Certificateless Broadcast Proxy
Re-encryption Scheme
In the following section, we present our model for a GCLBPRE. We define our notion as follows. Definition 5. A formal description of the GCLBPRE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Generate a list of public parameters PK and master key MK for a security parameter 
The Proposed Scheme-Detailed Construction

Overview
In this section, we present the first construction of group-oriented certificateless broadcast proxy re-encryption scheme. We design it for re-encrypting the ciphertext to a specific group of the receivers by using the main technique named asymmetric group key agreement, in which the sender calculates an asymmetric encryption key by aggregating all users' public keys and then uses this key to encrypt the massage. In our scheme, members can be classified into different groups according to their attributes, jurisdictions and positions. The sender then chooses the desired group to send the message.
Before expatiating the main algorithms, a brief sketch of our scheme is explained below (also see Fig. 1 ). First, PKG generates a list of public parameters PK and a master key MK, and then executes Partial-Private-Key-Extract algorithm to generate and send a partial-private-key to the user. Second, the user chooses a secret value 
The Proposed Algorithms: GCLBPRE
The scheme consists of the following algorithms and the detailed construction is shown as follows. 
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. The master secret key MK is defined as a tuple ) ,  from the user of index i. As the result, each member gets n secret shares from others as shown in Table 1 , where
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The sender
at random and computes the re-encryption key as follows: 
Second, each valid user j ID in the receiving group can reveal  by using his group member decryption key
, and then outputs Due to the security description above, we consider our scheme achieving the security of IND-CPA. The proposed scheme also reaches the toleration of the Type I and Type II adversaries for the CLPKE as the definition in [2] , [16] . The followings give a brief description of the two adversaries.
Decrypt2 (PK,
Type I adversary: Type I adversary I A does not access the master key MK . However,
I
A may request public key and then he will replace it with the values which he choices.
Type II adversary: Type II adversary
II
A has accessed the master key MK , but is not allowed to replace the public key of users.
A can request public key, make private key extraction and do the decryption.
Conclusions
We proposed a new concept of group-oriented certificateless broadcast proxy re-encryption scheme that combines the certificateless proxy re-encryption with the concept of broadcasting. Our scheme allows a sender to delegate the decryption of ciphertext to a specific group of receivers, via a re-encryption process of proxy. The proposed scheme is the first construction to re-encrypt the ciphertext for a specific group of the receivers by using the main technique named asymmetric group key agreement. Furthermore, the members in the scheme can be pre-classified into different groups according to their different properties to make the sender conveniently choose different desired groups when sending the message.
There is still insufficient for our scheme that the receiving group needs to be built in advance and then the members of the group are required to distribute their shares for the construction of the individual decryption keys. This result causes the amount of transmission between users in the group to be greatly large. How to reduce the transmission inside the group as well as to reach the goal of certificateless broadcast re-encryption with shorter ciphertext will become a major challenge and future research.
